Balancing Your Strengths against Your Felonies : Considerations for Military Recruitment of Ex-Offenders by Boucai, Michael
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2007 
"Balancing Your Strengths against Your Felonies": Considerations 
for Military Recruitment of Ex-Offenders 
Michael Boucai 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Boucai, "Balancing Your Strengths against Your Felonies": Considerations for Military Recruitment 
of Ex-Offenders, 61 U. Miami L. Rev. 997 (2007). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/67 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
University of Miami Law Review
VOLUME 61 JULY 2007 NUMBER 4
ARTICLES
"Balancing Your Strengths Against Your
Felonies": Considerations for Military
Recruitment of Ex-Offenders
MICHAEL BOUCAI*
I. INTRODUCTION .... ...................................................... 997
II. THE MORAL W AIVER SYSTEM ......................................... 1001
A. Substantive Laws and Policies Governing the Moral Waiver System ..... 1001
B. Moral Waiver Procedure: The Practice and Efficacy of Character
Screening ....................................................... 1006
C. Moral Waivers: The Numbers ...................................... 1011
Il. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARY RECRUITMENT OF Ex-OFFENDERS .... 1015
A. Ex-Offender Enlistment, Recruit Quality, and Servicemember Attrition .... 1015
B. Social Policy Considerations ....................................... 1018
1. THE RECRUIT POOL ............................................ 1019
2. WHY ENLIST? - THE EX-OFFENDER'S SITUATION ....................... 1021
3. WHY RECRUIT? - BENEFITS TO SOCIETY ........................... 1025
IV . C ONCLUSION ........................................................ 1028
TABLE 1. MORAL WAIVER REQUIREMENTS BY OFFENSE AND SERVICE ................... 1030
TABLE 2. 1990-1997 WAIVER GRANT FIGURES ................................... 1031
TABLE 3. 2003-2006 WAIVER GRANT FIGURES ................................... 1032
TABLE 4. 2003-2006 WAIVER GRANT FIGURES BY OFFENSE CATEGORY ................. 1032
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent New Yorker cartoon wittily, if unwittingly, captures a
growing reality of today's job market. Perusing an applicant's r6sum6,
* Associate, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP. Juris Doctor, Georgetown
University Law Center, 2005; Bachelor of Arts, History, Yale University, 2002. The author
thanks the Michael D. Palm Center for its generous support of this study, as well as Aaron Belkin,
Ryan Lozar, and Michael Ottolenghi for their advice and encouragement. This Article was
primarily composed while the author was a Visiting Researcher at the Georgetown University
Law Center.
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an employer confesses: "I'm trying to find a way to balance your
strengths against your felonies."' Though merely a punch line to most
readers, such tepid words of welcome are taken anything but lightly
among the numerous ex-offenders in the nation's workforce. The
600,000 individuals released each year from federal and state prisons
face tremendous difficulties finding employment - especially when, like
the applicant in the New Yorker cartoon, they are honest about their
backgrounds.
As those who hide their arrests and convictions well know, the
criminal closet is hardly conducive to job retention, performance, or pro-
motion. Nonetheless, secrecy is often the only alternative to unemploy-
ment. Echoing a widespread expert consensus, criminologist Joan
Petersilia has said that "finding a job is critical" to convicts' effective
reintegration into society.2 Employers' reluctance or outright refusal to
hire ex-offenders keeps many of these individuals at the margins of soci-
ety, increasing their likelihood of recidivism and reincarceration. 3
This Article deals with ex-offender employment in one context
where the necessity of balancing strengths against felonies is taken very
seriously indeed: the U.S. Armed Forces.4 It suggests revising the tradi-
tional wisdom that the military's "eligibility requirements are for the
protection of the government, and not for the soldier."5 In a spirit of
greater reciprocity, civilian society ought to pay closer attention to
whether and how ex-offenders gain access to military employment. Ser-
vice in the Armed Forces should be cautiously but seriously and frankly
considered as a potential career path for some of these individuals. Cer-
tainly we should continue to ask what former criminals can do for the
military; but we should also ask what the military can do for former
criminals - and what, in turn, the military can do for the communities in
which ex-offenders are expected, and so often fail, to build new and
1. Leo Cullum, Cartoon, NEW YORKER, Sept. 19, 2005, at 74.
2. Joan Petersilia, Hard Time: Ex-Offenders Returning Home After Prison, CORREC'nONS
TODAY, Apr. 2005, at 66, 67 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Doing More than Time, Op-Ed, CiHRsIAN SCi. MONITOR, May 4, 2001, at 10,
available at 2001 WLNR 1242682 ("True, about 40 percent of former convicts turn to crime
again. But that statistic would almost certainly shrink if more businesses looked beyond the
question of past felony convictions, and if state corrections departments did more to give inmates
an opportunity to prepare for life on the outside.").
4. In assessing potential recruits, including those with criminal histories, the military uses a
"whole person" standard that entails "evaluating [whether] the applicant's strengths outweigh the
reasons for disqualification." Leonard L. Etcho, The Effect of Moral Waivers on First-Term,
Unsuitability Attrition in the Marine Corps, at 4 (Mar. 1996) (thesis, Naval Postgraduate School),
available at http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA309309&Location=U2&doc=
getTRDoc.pdf.
5. Ex parte Dostal, 243 F. 664, 672 (N.D. Ohio 1917).
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productive lives.6
Recent developments at home and abroad make ex-offender enlist-
ment a particularly timely question. First, the issue relates in multiple
ways to the Armed Forces' faltering ability to fill ranks.7 As we will
see, ex-offenders' presence in the Armed Forces can be characterized as
a cause, effect, or even correction of the military's apparent recruitment
problem. Second, ex-offender enlistment constitutes, in and of itself, a
major recruitment trend.8 Many readers will be surprised to learn just
how many ex-offenders the Armed Services knowingly admit each year
- despite a statutory presumption against such accessions, and despite a
burden on enlistees to prove their qualifications.9 Finally, the public has
responded to the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal,' ° as well as other
disturbing instances of servicemember misconduct, t" with heightened
6. Norman Mailer's evocative description of the situation of a convict upon release from
prison has lost none of its force or truth:
Then one day they put the convict out the front door, told him today is magic....
Now, do it on your own. Go out, find a job, get up by yourself, report to work on
time, manage your money, do all the things you were taught not to do in prison.
Guaranteed to fail. Eighty percent went back to jail.
NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG 482 (1979).
7. See Tom Bowman, Army Accepts Crime in Recruits to Fill Its Needs, Military Issues
Waivers for Some Past Minor Offenses, BALT. SUN, Feb. 14, 2006, at 1A, available at 2006
WLNR 2554076; Frank Main, More Army Recruits Have Records: Number Allowed in with
Misdemeanors More than Doubles, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 19, 2006, at 3, available at 2006
WLNR 10550175. More general expressions of recruitment-related anxiety, from a mere two-
month period in 2005, include Philip Carter, The Quiet Man, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A19,
available at 2005 WLNR 10629369, Victor Davis Hanson, Are They in the Army Now? Cries of
Shortfall, Exhaustion, and Overstretch, NAT'L REV., July 4, 2005, at 17, Greg Jaffe, To Fill Ranks,
Army Acts to Retain Even Problem Enlistees, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2005, at B 1, and Greg Jaffe &
Yochi R. Dreazen, Army Might Seek Waivers to Call Guards Back Up, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2005,
at A3.
8. The mainstream press has devoted some attention to the significant population of ex-
offenders recruited into the Armed Forces. See, e.g., The Army, After Iraq, Op-Ed, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2007, § 4, at 11, available at 2007 WLNR 5097688 ("You do not have to look very hard
these days to see the grave damage the Bush administration's mismanagement of the Iraq conflict
has inflicted on the United States Army. Consider the moral waivers for violent offenders, to meet
recruitment targets." (emphasis supplied)); Bowman, supra note 7; Main, supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 601-210, at 4-2(c) (2005) [hereinafter
ARMY REGULATION 601-210], available at http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r60l%5F210.pdf
("The burden is on the applicant to prove to waiver authorities that he or she has overcome their
disqualifications for enlistment and that their acceptance would be in the best interests of the
Army.").
10. James Risen, G.L's Are Accused of Abusing Iraqi Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at
A15, available at 2004 WLNR 5501121; Thom Shankner & Dexter Filkins, Army Punishes 7 with
Reprimands for Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR
5604118; Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, General Took Guantanamo Rules to Iraq for Handling of
Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR 5538678.
11. Ryan Lenz, GIs May Have Planned Iraq Rape, Slayings, ABC NEWS, July 1, 2006,
available at http://abcnews.go.conVInternational/wireStory?id=2142323; John Kifner, Hate
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concern about the "checkered backgrounds" of some military recruits. 12
As the public continues to engage the issue of ex-offender enlist-
ment, it should take care to avoid the military's single-minded focus on
"suitability" disparities between ex-offenders and other recruits.' 3 These
well-documented differences are important considerations, but others,
which look beyond mere numbers, also merit attention: the fact that a
substantial majority of servicemembers with criminal histories are suc-
cessfully integrated into the Armed Forces; 4 the possibility that a prob-
lem in military culture, not military recruitment per se, is a more
proximate cause of the most disturbing instances of servicemember mis-
conduct; 5 and the more general possibility that the crimes committed by
recidivist offenders as civilians are worse in quantity, quality, or effect
than those committed by recidivists in uniform.' 6
Part II of this Article discusses the legal and empirical aspects of
ex-offender enlistment in the U.S. Armed Forces. It begins with the
laws, policies, and procedures regarding the "moral waivers" by which
individuals with criminal histories are admitted into the military. It then
describes the waiver system in action, drawing on original Department
of Defense ("DOD") data furnished directly to the author under the
Freedom of Information Act. The startling trends exposed in Part II -
from the military's use of moral waivers to knowingly recruit thousands
of persons with criminal backgrounds each year, to its failure to detect
Groups Are Infiltrating the Military, Group Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at A14, available
at 2006 WLNR 11719901.
12. Ken Silverstein, Pentagon Alerted to Trouble in Ranks, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at Al,
available at 2004 WLNR 19762878; see also Kate Zernike, Three Accused Soldiers Had Records
of Unruliness That Went Unpunished, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at A13, available at 2004
WLNR 5482807.
13. See infra Parts n.A-.B.
14. See infra Parts In.A-.B. It is worth questioning the efficiency, not to mention the
fairness, of excluding the whole class of ex-offenders from any and all kinds of military service.
A more reasonable, well-tailored solution might be to keep such recruits away from particularly
sensitive or consequential tasks (like guarding or interrogating enemy prisoners), or to do so until
they have sufficiently demonstrated their reliability in uniform. Of course this is, in some regards,
current military practice. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY RECRUITING:
NEW INITATIVES COULD IMPROVE CRIMINAL HISTORY SCREENING (1999) [hereinafter GAO
MILITARY RECRUITING], available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99053.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Hillman, Guarding Women: Abu Ghraib and Military Sexual
Culture, in ONE OF THE Guys: WOMEN As AGGRESSORS AND TORTURERS 111 (Tara McKelvey ed.,
2007); Hank Nuwer, Military Hazing, in THE HAZING READER 141 (Hank Nuwer ed., 2004); Carie
Little Hersh, Crossing the Line: Sex, Power, Justice, and the U.S. Navy at the Equator, 9 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 277 (2002) (describing in detail the simulated sex, degradation, and
humiliation involved in the Navy's initiation of sailors upon first crossing the equator).
16. See infra notes 191-202 and accompanying text. There is evidence, for example, that
recidivism rates are lower for those who enter the military with moral waivers and/or criminal
backgrounds than for those who do not enter the military at all.
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the criminal backgrounds of many thousands more - are discussed in
light of the competing needs and pressures faced by our contemporary
Armed Forces.
Part III describes some of the practical, social, and political consid-
erations that are and should be at play in the formulation and implemen-
tation of the Armed Forces' waiver policy. These include: the
characteristics of the American youth population from which recruits are
drawn; moral waiver recipients' performance, retention, and attrition
levels; ex-offenders' employment difficulties and the effect of these dif-
ficulties on criminal recidivism; and the social advantages of military
service among ex-offenders.
Synthesizing the descriptive information presented in Part II with
the policy concerns addressed in Part III, this Article concludes that ex-
offender recruitment, currently pursued through a system of winks and
nods, should be approached more forthrightly, and perhaps more vigor-
ously, for the good of civilian society and the Armed Forces.
II. THE MORAL WAIVER SYSTEM
A. Substantive Laws and Policies Governing the
Moral Waiver System
The Supreme Court has held that "voluntariness and capacity are
the only two requirements for a valid enlistment" into the U.S. Armed
Forces.' 7 Beyond these criteria, the federal government has long been
entrusted to "prescribe the requisite qualifications, and insist upon or
waive them in its discretion." 8 Generally, Congress has delegated this
authority to the Secretary of Defense, authorizing the Secretary to estab-
lish "physical, mental, moral, professional, and age" requirements for
enlistment. 9 A notable limitation on the Armed Forces' power to set
their own standards is the statutory exclusion of persons who have been
convicted of a felony.20 The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") cites
loss of the "right" to serve in the military as one of the many collateral
consequences of a felony conviction,2' and it is regularly described as
such in judicial opinions.2 2 Generally, disqualification on the basis of
17. Hodges v. Brown, 500 F. Supp. 25, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (citing In re Grimley, 137 U.S.
147, 151-53 (1890), affd, 649 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1981).
18. United States v. Cottingham, 40 Va. 615, 631 (Va. 1843).
19. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 12102(b) (2006) (relating to the Reserves).
20. 10 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006).
21. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, FEDERAL STATUTES IMPOSING
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION 3 (2000) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 504) [hereinafter
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/
collateral-consequences.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Mulloy v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1001, 1006 (D. Mass. 1996);
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moral character "encompasses individuals under judicial restraint [or]
with significant criminal records," persons "displaying antisocial or
other problematic behavior," and one-time service members whose dis-
charge was less than honorable.23
The same statute that disqualifies felons from military service per-
mits the Secretary of Defense to "authorize exceptions, in meritorious
cases." 24 Such exceptions are called "moral waivers," a designation that
underscores the military's use of criminal history as a proxy for moral
character. Just as the Armed Services may admit recruits who are
physically heavier than the rules allow via "weight waivers," they may
admit those with criminal histories - from traffic violations to felony
convictions - via moral waivers, which overcome these enlistees' prior
misconduct. Though the procedures and requirements governing their
allocation differ from Service to Service, moral waivers are widely used
throughout the Armed Forces.26
The military's nominal ban on ex-offenders - merely nominal
because the moral waiver system enjoys widespread observance in the
breach - is part of a larger legal and policy framework that particularly
discourages criminal behavior among servicemembers. The Uniform
Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") and the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, whose operation is by no means limited to situations
where enforcement of civilian laws by civilian courts is impracticable,27
are prominent examples of society's deference to the military's need to
Commonwealth v. Duffy, 639 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. 1994); In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Hyndman, 638 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Wis. 2002) (Wilcox, J., dissenting) ("The crime that the
court glosses over is not a minor one. Such a felony drug conviction would prevent Hyndman
from joining the Armed Forces, from becoming a police officer ...." (footnotes omitted)); see
also COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION, supra note 21, at 3.
23. SHEILA NATARAJ KIRBY & HARRY J. THIn, RAND, ENLISTED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 66 (1996).
24. 10 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006).
25. Anthony W. Frabutt, The Effects of Pre-Service Legal Encounters on First-Term
Unsuitability Attrition in the U.S. Navy, at 2-4 (Mar. 1996) (unpublished thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School), available at http://www.stormingmedia.us/47/4767/A476703.html.
Criminal history is an imperfect measure of moral character. As Frabutt explains,
committing a crime does not necessarily equate with low moral character. First,
individual circumstances that may not reflect moral character can determine one's
behavior. There may be economic or environmental factors that influence an
individual's actions. Second, one must also take into account remorse, reform, or
rehabilitation, .... as well as the fact that people "pay" for their crimes with legally-
defined forms of punishment.
Id. at 4.
26. Thus, it is the policy of "the Military Services" as a whole to acquire and use, whenever
possible, criminal history records to identify "those who may not be enlisted in the Military
Services unless a waiver is granted." 32 C.F.R. § 96.4(b) (emphasis supplied). Notably, this is
the "highest" legal reference to moral waivers.
27. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2006) (listing the persons subject to UCMJ jurisdiction).
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regulate the discipline and character of its troops. Individuals may be
discharged or dismissed from the military for committing a crime,28 and
federal law sometimes ensures that even veterans are subject to special
punishment.2 9
A DOD directive explains that moral character requirements'
"underlying purpose" is to screen out individuals "who are likely to
become disciplinary cases or security risks or who disrupt good order,
morale, and discipline."30 An earlier version of the directive invokes the
military's "responsibility to parents," who do not wish to see "their sons
and daughters ... placed into close association with persons who have
committed serious offenses or whose records show ingrained delin-
quency behavior patterns."'" In a similar vein, some commentators have
suggested that the prohibition reflects concern over the Armed Forces'
"public image," because a "criminal element" in the military would
affect not only recruiting and retention but also popular support and
respect.
3 2
Yet the military's policy on ex-offenders, and even the statutory
disqualification of convicted felons, hardly amounts to a "class-wide"
exclusion.33 The intricate system employed to detect meritorious excep-
tions, like the widespread use of waivers, demonstrates the Armed
28. See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.; 10 U.S.C. § 804;
10 U.S.C. §§ 816-20.
29. "No [military] pension... shall be paid to... an individual who has been imprisoned in a
Federal, State, [or] local . . . penal institution . . . as a result of conviction of a felony or
misdemeanor for any part of the period beginning sixty-one days after such individual's
imprisonment begins and ending when such individual's imprisonment ends." 38 U.S.C.
§ 1505(a) (2006). Nonetheless, the lost pension may be paid to the spouse or children of the
imprisoned veteran. 38 U.S.C. § 1505(b).
30. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION 1304.26 art. E2.2.7 (2005) [hereinafter DOD
INSTRUCTION 1304.26], available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130426p.pdf.
Roughly the same rationales have been articulated from a more empirical perspective. See
Frabutt, supra note 25, at 1. The primary justifications for excluding ex-offenders include, albeit
more credibly, some of the same concerns advanced by those who argue against homosexuals in
the military, an association reinforced in DOD's own recruitment literature. See, e.g., William A.
Woodruff, Homosexuality and Military Service: Legislation, Implementation, and Litigation, 64
UMKC L. REV. 121, 163-64 (1995). The recruitment directive moves directly from the Services'
policy on homosexuals to its policy on ex-offenders. The "explanation/determination" guidelines
for the Air Force's "Category I ineligibility factors" - major offenses "which cannot be waived" -
refer in the same breath to persons who admit to engaging in homosexual conduct and persons
who have been convicted "of an offense punishable by death." Other Category I ineligibility
factors are "transexualism and other gender identity disorders, exhibitionism, transvestism, [and]
voyeurism." AIR NAT'L GUARD, INSTRUCTION 36-2002, at 15, 57 (2004), available at http://www.
e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/ang/36/angi36-2002/angi36-2002.pdf.
31. DEr'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTnVE 1304.26 art. E1.2.7 (1993), available at http://www.dtic.
mil/whs/directives/corres/text/d I 30426p.txt.
32. See, e.g., Frabutt, supra note 25, at 2.
33. Woodruff, supra note 30, at 164 ("Within each of [the] broad categories [upon which the
military chooses to restrict enlistment,] there may be individuals who could perform well in
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Forces' collective refusal to reject "personnel irrespective of their indi-
vidual suitability."34 Instead, most applicants benefit from the "whole
person" standard.35 Sometimes criticized for its failure to provide con-
crete guidance to recruiters,3 6 the "whole person" standard permits con-
sideration of "the circumstances surrounding the criminal violations, the
age of the person committing them, and personal interviews" with the
applicant and others, as well as a recruit's other aptitudes, experiences,
and characteristics.
37
Documents used throughout the DOD refer to a common set of
waiver codes, but the offenses encompassed under each code vary by
Service, with one or more Services foregoing notation of certain codes -
and therefore certain offenses - altogether.38 DOD Form 1966 initially
classifies offenses by their time of commission: enlistment waivers for
violations that occurred prior to entry into Armed Forces' Delayed Entry
Program ("DEP") and accession waivers for violations that occurred
after entry into DEP but before the formal start of military service.39
The alphabetical code that Form 1966 applies to either kind of waiver is
determined first by infraction type (law violation or illegal substance-
related admission) and then by a variety of potential factors: the
offender's age (juvenile or adult); the offense's magnitude (serious or
non-serious); the type of offense (traffic violation, non-traffic violation,
felony); and/or the substance involved (alcohol, marijuana, or another
drug).
4 0
In addition to the categories suggested by DOD Form 1066, the
Services further distinguish between felonies (e.g., kidnapping, mur-
der),41 serious misdemeanors (e.g., assault, petty larceny), minor misde-
certain positions in the military. Enlistment qualifications, however, exclude them on a class-wide
basis."). There are, in fact, very few class-wide exclusions.
34. Id. (stating that "Congress has imposed a number of restrictions on entry that disqualify
personnel irrespective of their individual suitability") (emphasis supplied).
35. See, e.g., ARMY REGULATION 601-210, supra note 9, at 4-2(c) ("Waiver authorities will
apply the 'whole person' concept when considering waiver applications.").
36. One study calls for research that would allow the services to "establish guidelines for
those who must approve/deny requests for moral character waivers, and provide empirically
grounded criteria and standards on which to base those decisions." DAN J. PUTKA ET AL.,
EVALUATING MORAL CHARACTER WAIVER POLICY AGAINST SERVICEMEMBER AIrRITION AND IN-
SERVICE DEVIANCE THROUGH THE FIRST 18 MONTHS OF SERVICE, at viii-ix (2003).
37. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 2.
38. See id. at 2-5. Like the Services' lack of uniformity in the substantive criteria used for
granting or withholding moral waivers, this lack of consistency in categorization has been
criticized as confusing and inefficient. See PuTKA ET AL., supra note 36, at vii (recommending
adoption of a "DoD-wide, standard law violation classification framework").
39. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FoRM 1966, RECORD OF MILITARY PROCESSING §§ II-17(h), -18(f),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgtforms/eforms/dd1966.pdf.
40. See PUrK ET AL., supra note 36, at 8.
41. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 3; Frabutt, supra note 25, at 20. Felonies,
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meanors (e.g., discharging a firearm within city limits, removing public
property), minor non-traffic offenses (e.g., disorderly conduct, vandal-
ism), serious traffic offenses (e.g., driving with a revoked license), and
minor traffic offenses (e.g., speeding).4 z Even at this level of specificity,
there are differences between the various branches' classification of
crimes.4 3 By far the most important of these are the Army's decision to
ignore - that is, to forgive without granting a moral waiver - pre-service
abuse of illegal substances, and the Marine Corps' requirement of a
moral waiver for even onetime marijuana use. 4
Offense categorization is important because it largely determines
whether an enlistee will be eligible for a waiver and, if so, how many
other offenses are waivable. Table 1 below, based on information com-
piled by the U.S. Government Accounting Office ("GAO"), summarizes
the extent to which each Service will consider waiving certain kinds of
offenses. Evidently, all branches take advantage of their wide discretion
to create substantive moral waiver policy. Three of the four Services
decline to use one category, "Serious Traffic Offenses," which the DOD
nonetheless employs in its waiver-related operations. The Navy and the
Air Force will consider waiving multiple felonies, but the Army and
Marine Corps allow no more than one.45 Apart from crimes specifically
classified as drug offenses, serious misdemeanors (also known as serious
non-traffic offenses) account for a majority of all moral waivers 46 and
are treated quite differently from one Service to another - the Navy will
waive no more than two such offenses, the Army refuses to waive more
than four, the Marine Corps sets its limit at five, and the Air Force
imposes no formal numerical restriction whatsoever.47
generally understood to be offenses whose punishment equals or exceeds one year in prison,
encompass a wide range of offenses. As indicated by the earlier reference to the Air Force's
automatic disqualification of individuals convicted of felonies carrying the death penalty, some
crimes in this category will be treated more harshly than others.
42. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 3.
43. "While the standards across the Services are similar, there are minor variations which
create Service-specific requirements." DEP'T OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, MILITARY RECRUITING AND WAIVERS 3 (2007) [hereinafter DOD MILITARY
RECRUITING AND WAIVERS] (on file with author).
44. See GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 27-28 (explaining that the Army
defines pre-service illegal substance use as a medical, not a moral, problem); DOD MILITARY
RECRUITING AND WAIVERS, supra note 43 at 1.
45. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 4. This should not be taken to mean that
the Navy and the Air Force habitually admit individuals who require more than one felony waiver.
It is likely that most such individuals are excluded on recruiters' discretion rather than by
automatic disqualification.
46. See infra tbl.4.
47. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 4.
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B. Moral Waiver Procedure: The Practice and
Efficacy of Character Screening
"Moral character screening" is the process by which recruiters
review enlistees' criminal and substance abuse histories.48 Screening
procedures are "extensive," furnishing up to fourteen separate opportu-
nities (involving up to seven different recruiting personnel) for recruits
to disclose facts relevant to a moral waiver application.49 Although the
screening process is different from branch to branch, each Service uses a
similar set of methods,50 including interviews, briefings, forms, 5' as well
as state, local, and federal record checks.52 Such persistent inquiry is
especially important in light of the consequences of dishonesty or non-
disclosure: enlistees who intentionally conceal disqualifying information
"may be refused enlistment at any point during the recruiting process or,
after enlisting, [may be] discharged for fraudulent enlistment."53
Beginning at the first recruitment interview, an applicant is asked to
disclose "all arrests or convictions," regardless of when the incident
occurred and, in the case of arrests, regardless of whether the applicant
was found guilty.54 If a "significant" issue arises, the recruiter and the
applicant are expected to discuss all relevant facts and circumstances. In
deciding whether to seek a moral waiver, recruiters are guided in part by
48. PuTKA ET AL., supra note 36, at v.
49. GAO MILITARY RECRUrrING, supra note 14, at 1, 6.
50. PUrKA ET AL., supra note 36, at 1 (citing J.L. BURNFIELD, K. HANDY, D.E. SIPES & J.H.
LAURENCE, MORAL CHARACTER AND ENLISTMENT STANDARDS: DOCUMENTATION, POLICY, AND
PROCEDURE REVIEW (1999)).
51. Applicants are required to complete the following forms used in obtaining criminal
history information: (1) Record of Military Processing - Armed Forces of the
United States (DD Form 1966), (2) Personnel Security Questionnaire (SF-86), (3)
the Police Record Check (DD Form 369), and (4) the Armed Forces Fingerprint
Card (DD Form 2280). These forms elicit information on police record histories,
drug and alcohol use and abuse, financial records and delinquencies, and any
juvenile arrest or criminal activity.
GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 8 (footnote omitted). The respective Services will
pose similar questions on forms of their own. For example, the Air Force Enlistment
questionnaire asks:
I. Have you ever been involved, arrested, indicted, or convicted for any violation of
civil or military law, including nonjudicial punishment pursuant to Article 15 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or minor traffic violations?
8. Are you under investigation by military or civilian authorities? ...
9. Are you under the influence of drugs or alcohol? ...
10. Have you ever tested positive for an illegal drug/substance?
AIR NAT'L GUARD, INSTRUCTION 36-2002, supra note 30, at 36 (emphasis in original).
52. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 5 (noting that "[elach service screens for
criminal background information in a similar manner.).
53. Id. at 9.
54. PUri Er AL., supra note 36, at 1 (emphasis in original).
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the offense classification rules described above." Admission or sus-
pected concealment of a criminal record triggers a more rigorous back-
ground investigation than the general national agency check conducted
upon admission into DEP.5 6 Although recruits normally enter DEP
"[r]egardless of moral character status, 57 subsequent participation
entails considerable inquiry into their so-called "moral" background.58
At any point during the enlistment process, discovery of informa-
tion that would render the applicant ineligible for a waiver - for exam-
ple, a judicial conviction for spousal abuse - automatically terminates
the recruitment process.59 So long as the applicant's offense does not
entail such immediate disqualification, the first disclosure or discovery
55. Id. at 1, 2.
56. Id. at 2; see also, e.g., ARMY REGULATION 601-210, supra note 9, at 2-11 (b)(2)-(4). This
section entitled "Moral and Administrative Criteria," states that
[aipplicants who claim no law violations or claims [sic] only minor traffic offenses
(except reckless or careless or imprudent driving) will have police record checks,
based on current residence, obtained from three levels: (a) City or municipal,
military installation law enforcement. (b) County law enforcement. (c) State law
enforcement. (3) Applicant who claims law violations other than minor traffic
offenses will have police record checks completed where applicant has lived,
worked ... and attended school during the 3 years prior to application into the DEP/
DS/DTP; police/court documents where the offense(s) occurred will be obtained
from: (a) City or municipal, military installation law enforcement. (b) County law
enforcement. (c) State law enforcement. (d) Court documents. (e) Probation
departments. (f) Adult correctional facility. (g) Juvenile correctional facilities. (4)
Applicants requiring a moral waiver for any misdemeanor or felony level charge,
regardless of disposition, will have police record checks obtained from: (a) City or
municipal, military installation law enforcement. (b) County law enforcement. (c)
State law enforcement. (d) Court documents. (e) Probation departments. (f) Adult
correctional facility. (g) Juvenile correctional facility.
Id. (internal divisions omitted).
57. PUTKA ET AL., supra note 36, at 2.
58. When the [national agency] checks involve fingerprints, the services request a
fingerprint verification - a comparison of an enlistee's fingerprints against FBI
criminal records to ensure that they are from the same individual whose name was
associated with a possible arrest record identified through [a] descriptive data
search. Also, during the [DEP], recruiters are in contact with the enlistees and
continue to inquire about their criminal background and any current contact with
law enforcement agencies .... After the [DEP] period .... enlistees are asked again
to disclose disqualifying information when they report to basic training, which lasts
from 6 to 12 weeks depending on the service.
GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 8-9.
59. The Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act makes it a felony for anyone
convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to ship, receive, or possess firearms or
ammunition, and provides no military or law enforcement exception. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
(2005). Studies reveal, however, that "a small number of waivers have been granted to
individuals convicted of domestic violence-related charges." DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE TASK
FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INITIAL REPORT 53 (2001); see also PUTKA ET AL., supra note 36,
at 2 ("If the recruiter discovers that the applicant is subject to further or pending judicial
proceedings, the application process is also terminated immediately.").
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of any law violation initiates the moral waiver process. 60  Recruiters
may begin this process at any point in the recruitment schedule.6' Once
a waiver's necessity becomes apparent, DOD-wide policy requires col-
lection of all possible information "about the 'who, what, when, where,
and/or why"' of the offense at issue, as well as letters of recommenda-
tion from "responsible community leaders. 62
Though moral waiver requests may be rejected at any level of the
recruitment hierarchy, an offense's severity is the most important factor
determining the level at which a waiver request may be granted.63
Recruiting commanders are responsible for approving waivers of the
most serious offenses.' At the other end of the spectrum are disclosures
of illegal substance use, which may be excused by low-level recruiters
who are otherwise unqualified to grant waivers .6  The third letter of an
offense's waiver code signals the required "waiver authority level. 6 6
Clearly, the moral screening process is elaborate. But is it effec-
tive? Do a dozen requests for confession make the system airtight, or
does such persistence betray a certain lack of confidence in the
confessor?
Although the precise failure rate is impossible to measure, the
moral screening process, as presently constituted, is fundamentally and
drastically flawed. Official background checks for all enlistees - that is,
across-the-board criminal history searches - were discarded in 1986
because formal prohibitions on the release of such information con-
stantly thwarted recruiters' investigations.67 Since 1986, however, the
same problem continues to arise in a smaller (and, per capita, more prob-
lematic) segment of the applicant pool - namely, individuals who have
60. For a helpful description of the moral character waiver approval process, see PUTKA ET
AL., supra note 36, at 1-2.
61. GAO MILITARY RECRUrrING, supra note 14, at 9.
62. See DOD INSTRUCTION 1304.26, supra note 30, art. E2.2.7.2.2.
63. PuTrKA Er AL., supra note 36, at 2.
64. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 9.
65. PuTrKA Er AL., supra note 36, at 1, 8.
66. Id. at 8. The codes are as follows:
A: Waiver granted by the highest authority level
B: Waiver granted by the Recruiting Command Headquarters level
C: Waiver granted by the USMC Regional Command level
D: Waiver granted by the USA Brigade, USN Area, USMC District, USAF Group
level
E: Waiver granted by the USA Battalion, USN District, USAF Squadron level,
USMC Recruiting Station
F: Waiver granted by the Coast Guard Recruiting Center
Id.
67. ELI S. FLYER, DIRECTORATE FOR ACCESSION POLICY OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR
DEF., RECRUITS WITH A PRESERVICE ARREST HISTORY: IDENTIFICATION, CHARACTERISTICS, AND
BEHAVIOR ON ACTIVE DuTY 4-5 (1995).
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actually confessed to an arrest or conviction or who have otherwise
acknowledged the existence of a criminal record.68 The special protec-
tion that background concealment statutes afford juvenile offenders is
particularly frustrating for military recruiters given that seventeen to
twenty-one year olds constitute the primary recruit population.69 The
DOD and other military voices have complained that such restrictions
are a serious defect in the moral screening system.7 ° Anthony Frabutt,
for one, urges the military "to investigate ways" to fix this problem,
including the repeal or modification of federal,7 ' state,72 and local poli-
cies that bar or restrict official disclosure of criminal histories.73
The Armed Forces' narrowly constrained use of official criminal
records entails almost complete reliance on recruits' own confessions of
wrongdoing.74 Because the military is hardly immune from ex-offend-
ers' tendency to hide their criminal pasts from employers,75 many indi-
68. See id. at 2-3.
69. GAO MILITARY RECRUmNG, supra note 14, at 12; see also BETH J. ASCH, CAN Du &
MATrHIAS SCHONLAU, RAND, POLICY OFrIONS FOR MILITARY RECRUITING IN THE COLLEGE
MARKET: RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 1 (2004) (referring to the "military's traditional
recruiting market, namely high school graduates with no immediate plans to attend college").
70. Before publication, the GAO's report on moral character screening was submitted to the
DOD for comment. The GAO devoted a considerable portion of its discussion to criminal record
access, a problem discussed in as much or more detail than any other subject covered in the report.
Nonetheless, the DOD noted that "the report does not fully address [its] need for timely local and
state criminal history information at a reasonable cost." GAO MILITARY RECRUING, supra note
14, at 36.
71. DOD policy states that the military services shall obtain and review criminal
history record information from the criminal justice system and Defense Security
Service to determine whether applicants are acceptable for enlistment and for
assignment to special programs. However, under the Security Clearance
Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 9101), criminal justice agencies are required to provide
this information to DOD only when an individual is being investigated for eligibility
for access to classified information or sensitive national security duties. These
agencies, which include federal, state, and local agencies, are not required to
provide this information for determining basic eligibility or suitability for enlistment
(i.e., employment).
Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
72. Many states, and indeed many municipalities, charge fees for releasing information. A
Navy Recruiting Command survey found that "33 states charged fees ranging from $5 to $59."
Id. at 12. The effect of such fees varies depending on the particular Service:
The Army has a policy to request local and state record checks for all applicants, but
will not pay these fees, and therefore, does not obtain information from states that
charge fees. The other services request these record checks only if an applicant
admits to a criminal history. Navy and Marine Corps policy allows recruiters to pay
for the checks; Air Force policy requires applicants to obtain the checks and pay any
fees associated with the checks.
Id.
73. Id. at 2. See generally, Frabutt, supra note 25, at 50.
74. Frabutt, supra note 25, at 3.
75. See infra Part III.B.2.
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viduals with moral disqualifications are admitted into the Services
without even applying for the necessary waiver. The self-preservationist
impulse underlying ex-offenders' reticence is hardly incomprehensible
in light of honesty's often harsh consequences, and a decision to heed
that impulse may be particularly understandable when it is so easy to get
away with lying.76 Sometimes, however, recruiters themselves may be
responsible, in whole or in part, for an applicant's perjury - they might
suggest or imply that a recruit keep certain facts hidden, or they might
conceal information on their own initiative.77
Whatever their motive, cover-ups do happen: "[I]n reality, there are
many enlistees in the military today with a concealed criminal his-
tory."7 8 The criminal closet apparently pervades the Armed Forces. Of
course, its exact prevalence is impossible to measure for the same reason
that detection is difficult in the first place - namely, widespread restric-
tions on access to criminal records. What research exists is not encour-
aging. A 1995 study found that the majority of Navy recruits with an
arrest history did not seek, let alone receive, a moral waiver.79 Another
Navy study conducted one year later found a non-disclosure rate of
thirty-one percent for non-felony convictions and ninety-one percent for
felony convictions; in the juvenile sample, the figures were even higher
for both offense categories.8" And while it is true that among a sample
of more than 48,000 Navy recruits, only thirty-eight percent of those
with a documented "prior legal encounter" entered the service without
the appropriate waiver,8" this relatively encouraging figure was offset by
76. To emphasize how irresistible lying may seem to an ex-offender, consider again that an
"applicant is instructed to divulge" information about any offense even "if [the] records were
sealed or expunged." PUTKA ET AL., supra note 36, at 1.
77. See Frabutt, supra note 25, at 23-24; see also Damien Cave, Army Recruiters Say They
Feel Pressure to Bend Rules, N.Y. TIMEs, May 3, 2003, at A23, available at 2005 WLNR
6894465 ("Several [recruiters] spoke of concealing mental-health histories and police records....
[One recruiter said] he has been ordered [by his superiors] to conceal police records and minor
medical conditions ....").
78. See Frabutt, supra note 25, at 10.
79. See Miguel A. Lake, Navy Personnel with In-Service Criminal Records: Characteristics of
Offenders and Career Implications, at 7 (Dec. 1996) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School), available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA326534 (citation omitted).
80. Juvenile convictions were disclosed at a rate of sixty percent for non-felonies and three
percent for felonies. See Jeffrey W. Connor, The Effects of Pre-Service Criminal History on
Recruit Performance in the U.S. Navy, at 31 (Mar. 1997) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School), available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA331671.
81. Frabutt, supra note 25, at 23. Moral waivers are not required for mere "encounters" with
the law (e.g., arrests that do not result in conviction), even though applicants are required to
confess such encounters. Pre-service convictions are a good indicator of moral character for
screening purposes. But as Frabutt observes, using "convictions instead of arrests to evaluate
moral character... holds well with the values of American society, whose justice system is based
on the concept of a person's innocence 'until proven guilty.' . . . [A]n arrest does not equate to
guilt ... [and] there is no reason to assume that the individual has broken the law." Id. at 3-4.
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the discovery that convicted felons had a two percent disclosure rate,
compared with seventy-nine percent for recruits convicted of misde-
meanors.82 Based on these findings, the study concluded that "the
Navy's current system for providing moral waivers and reviewing the
background of applicants for enlistment is ineffective in identifying per-
sons with a pre-service arrest history."83
C. Moral Waivers: The Numbers
Although we cannot determine precisely how many ex-offenders
enter the military, even the drastically deficient official figures - i.e., the
number of moral waivers granted each year - establish that a startling
percentage of servicemembers have criminal histories. Moreover,
although many waivers excuse either minor offenses or admitted-but-
unpunished illegal substance use, about one-third relate to what the
DOD calls "serious non-traffic offenses."84  Such offenses do not
include felonies, which constitute a separate, significant, but relatively
small class of crimes for which moral waivers are routinely granted.
Table 2 provides the number of moral waivers each Service
bestowed, and the number the Armed Forces as a whole bestowed, for
fiscal years 1990 through 1997.85 The GAO compiled this data based on
the Defense Manpower Data Center's enlistment and separation
figures.86 Table 3 provides the number of moral waivers the Armed
Forces granted for fiscal years 2003 through 2006 obtained directly from
the DOD for use in this Article.87 Although the DOD was unable to
provide reliable data for fiscal years 1998 through 2002,88 it is likely
that these years witnessed an increase in waiver rates given "the difficult
82. Id. at 27.
83. Id. at 49.
84. See DOD MILITARY RECRUITING AND WAIVERS, supra note 43, at 4; DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
OFFICE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION & SEC. REV., MORAL WAIVER DATA, REF. 05-5-0960
[hereinafter DOD FOIA 05-5-0960] (on file with author).
85. Throughout this section, references to years indicate fiscal, not calendar, years. For a
summary of moral waiver trends prior to 1990, see generally ELI S. FLYER, DIRECTORATE FOR
ACCESSION POLICY OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR DEF., CHARACTERISTICS AND BEHAVIOR
OF RECRUITS ENTERING MILITARY SERVICE WITH AN OFFENSE HISTORY (1990).
86. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 26.
87. See DOD MILITARY RECRUITING AND WAIVERS, supra note 43, at 2.
88. In February 2005, the author submitted a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request
to the DOD, seeking a variety of information regarding ex-offender enlistment in the Armed
Forces between fiscal years 1998 and 2004. E-mail from Michael Boucai, Author, to Defense
Manpower Data Center, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Undersecretary of Defense, DOD
(Feb. 8, 2005) (on file with author). Although the author received a partial response to that
request in October 2005, see DOD FOIA 05-5-0960, supra note 84, th- DOD eventually
disclaimed the data it provided in that response. In January 2007, the DOD furnished numbers
pertaining to fiscal years 2003 through 2005, explaining that "data issues" - coding and
compilation errors - made it "just too difficult to go back [as] far" as "originally requested."
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recruiting experience of the late 1990s."8 9
Beyond formal, internal policy changes in the classification and
treatment of offenses, the Armed Forces have had difficulty accounting
for fluctuations in moral waiver rates.9° In fact, such policy changes
drastically obscure more salient variables relating to overall trends in
recruit numbers and quality.9' Nearly all military standards will reflect
these fluctuations, 92 but waiver rates - moral and otherwise - should be
one of the first manifestations of general recruitment developments, pre-
cisely because waiver systems, rather than outright bans, provide flexi-
bility for dealing with the vicissitudes of supply and demand. In years
when recruitment is flagging or when a good civilian job market attracts
many well-qualified workers - developments that tend to coincide -
recruiters, anxious to fill enlistment quotas, generally will accept more
individuals who require waivers, and they will grant waivers for more
serious offenses than they would in times of plenty.93 As one study
Email from Dennis J. Drogo, DOD, to Michael Boucai, Author (Jan. 19, 2006) (on file with
author).
89. Christopher Jehn, Sustaining the Force: Introduction, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE:
THIRTY YEARS OF SERVICE 55-56 (Barbara A. Bicksler et al. eds., 2004); see also RICHARD J.
BUDDIN, RAND, SUCCESS OF FIRST-TERM SOLDIERS: THE EFFECTS OF RECRUITING PRACTICES
AND RECRUIT CHARACTERISTICS 7 (2005) ("In FY1998 and FY1999, the civilian economy
boomed, and Army recruiting struggled, accepting more low-quality recruits to satisfy
requirements.").
90. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 28 ("The services could not explain the
reasons for these trends.").
91. Annual recruitment cohorts, like grape vintages, become known for their size and quality.
2000 through 2003 are known in the Army as "strong recruiting years," a "success ... related to a
weak economy and, possibly, the patriotic fervor for the war against terrorism." BUDDiN, supra
note 89, at 1. These years stand in contrast to the "difficult recruiting experience of the late
1990s." Jehn, supra note 89, at 56. Examining more long-term trends, Armor and Sackett noted
that "there have been substantial variations in recruit quality over the past 20 years, from
unprecedented lows in the late 1970s to record highs in the early 1990s." David J. Armor & Paul
R. Sackett, Manpower Quality in the All-Volunteer Force, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE:
THIRTY YEARS OF SERVICE, supra note 89, at 90.
92. Minimum standards for acceptance into the military were established early in
military history but generally these standards, as Eitelberg et al.... point out, act as
"flexible gates that open and close in reaction to the shifting needs of national
defense and manpower recruitment .... Certain circumstances, such as a recruiting
drought or a need for mass mobilization, typically necessitate less stringent physical
standards, lower education and ability criteria, and more lenient eligibility
requirements in other areas. Conversely, during periods of peace when the standing
army is streamlined to function as a 'caretaker,' or during periods of high
unemployment when military 'jobs' are relatively more attractive to the youthful
workforce, the Armed services are usually able to be more selective and the
qualitative barriers to entry are strengthened."
KIRBY & THIE, supra note 23, at 66 (citing MARK J. ErTELBERG ET AL., SCREENING FOR SERVICE 7
(1984)) (footnote omitted).
93. Lake, supra note 79, at 5 (explaining that a 1990 Eli S. Flyer study concluded "that the
differences between services were likely due to differences on pressure on recruiters to fill
enlistment quotas"). Referring to the Marine Corps, Leonard Etcho stated outright that "[t]he
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concluded, moral waivers are "utilized by the services to fill immediate
manpower needs."94
But recruiters' willingness to pursue a moral waiver for their enlis-
tees does not always or necessarily ensure the triumph of quantity over
quality. Moral waivers are regularly used to bolster the candidacy of
otherwise good prospects. Several studies indicate that recruiters are
more likely to grant moral waivers to recruits who excel in areas other
than character, a practice that military policy researchers have explicitly
recommended.95 A 1988 study focusing on servicemembers assigned to
sensitive occupations found that seventy percent of those who received a
moral waiver performed in the upper half of the Armed Forces Qualifi-
cation Test ("AFQT") and were, compared to those who enlisted without
a waiver, more likely to be high school graduates.96 The authors
surmised that "the services are willing to take some risks in accessing
personnel [by granting moral waivers] ... if the personnel have higher
aptitude levels." 97
Focusing on Navy enlistees from California over a seven-year
period, Frabutt determined that seventy-six percent of recruits who
received a misdemeanor waiver and sixty-eight percent of those who
received a felony waiver were in the middle AFQT category or higher.98
Frabutt also investigated whether the tendency to grant waivers to indi-
viduals with compensatory qualities results in higher rates of criminal
granting of moral waivers is often driven by the supply of applicants. It is necessary for the
Marine Corps to grant moral waivers in order to meet first-term enlistment requirements." Etcho,
supra note 4, at 4. In a similar vein, responding to a "dwindling" supply of troops, Army field
commanders were recently instructed to "retain soldiers they had been intending to discharge for
drug and alcohol abuse." Philip Carter, The Quiet Man, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A19,
available at 2005 WLNR 10629369.
94. Martin F. Wiskoff & Norma E. Dunipace, Moral Waivers and Suitability for High
Security Military Jobs, DEF. PERSONNEL SEC. RESEARCH AND EDUC. CmR., Dec. 1988, at 14; see
also Carter, supra note 7; Jaffe, supra note 7 ("To keep more soldiers in the service, the Army has
told battalion commanders, who typically command 800-soldier units, that they can no longer
bounce soldiers from the service for poor fitness, pregnancy, alcohol and drug abuse or generally
unsatisfactory performance. . . . Instead, the battalion commanders must send the problem
soldiers' cases up to their brigade commander, who typically commands about 3,000 soldiers.").
95. See generally JANICE H. LAURENCE, JENNIFER NAUGHTON & DICKIE A. HARRIS, U.S.
ARMY RESEARCH INST. FOR THE BEHAVIORAL & SOCIAL SCIENCES, ATrRITION REVISITED:
IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTIONS (1995); PUTKA ET AL., supra note 36, at 27 ("The
Services may benefit from requiring higher standards on other selection criteria (e.g., being a high
school diploma graduate, having higher AFQT scores) from recruits who require [moral waivers]
for entry into Service. Using such factors in a compensatory manner for recruits who require
[moral waivers] for entry into Service would likely help to bring attrition rates among such
individuals more in line with attrition rates for those Servicemembers that don't require waivers
for entry." (internal citation omitted)).
96. See Wiskoff & Dunipace, supra note 94, at 9-10.
97. Id.
98. Frabutt, supra note 25, at 25.
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history non-disclosure among recruits with lower AFQT scores. He
found that recruits with a prior legal encounter ("PLE") in the lower
AFQT categories have "a hidden PLE percentage level" nine points
higher than those with a PLE in the upper AFQT categories.99
Recruiters' tendency to be more lenient with higher-quality applicants
was documented even more dramatically in Leonard Etcho's study of
moral character screening in the Marine Corps. In 1991, Etcho found
that approximately sixty-four percent of moral waiver applicants in the
highest AFQT category were approved, compared to approximately
twenty-nine percent of those in the lowest AFQT category."°
Numbers are not everything, though. In some respects, the absolute
quantity of moral waivers granted in a given year is less important than
the substantive offenses underlying those waivers. Etcho's study recog-
nized this possibility, distinguishing between the thousands of waivers
granted for minor drug and traffic offenses and the "small percentage" -
at the time of Etcho's writing, approximately 500 per year - related to
felony convictions. The latter, he argued, "cannot be excused as typical
'youth mischief,'," 0  and neither can the "serious non-traffic offenses"
that, as Table 4 shows, currently account for about one-third of the
Armed Services' moral waivers.'0 2
Available data ultimately leave us with a dramatic but woefully
incomplete picture of ex-offender enlistment in the Armed Forces. On
one hand, it is clear that the Services have admitted tens of thousands of
recruits via moral waivers. On the other hand, the number of waiver
recipients falls far short of the number of enlistees with criminal histo-
ries. The next section examines whether, why, and to what extent these
trends matter.
99. However, Frabutt also found that moral waiver recipients were less likely to have
graduated from high school, which he considered puzzling in light of the fact that the Navy
"carefully screen[s] to enlist only those who possess 'desirable' characteristics." Id. at 26, 32.
100. Etcho, supra note 4, at 28.
101. Id. at 25.
102. The data contained in Table 4 was obtained directly from the DOD for use in this study.
See DOD MILrrARY RECRUrING AND WAIVERS, supra note 43, at 4. In the moral waiver context,
felonies basically retain their legal definition (and therefore include crimes like arson, cattle
rustling, criminal libel, grand larceny, housebreaking, kidnapping, and murder); "serious non-
traffic offenses," previously called "serious misdemeanors," include offenses like assault and petty
larceny; discharging a firearm within city limits and removing property from public grounds are
examples of "minor misdemeanors"; the category of "minor non-traffic" offenses encompasses
infractions like disorderly conduct and vandalism, driving with a revoked license is an example of
a "serious traffic" offense, while speeding is an example of a "minor traffic" offense. GAO
MILrrARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 2-3.
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARY
RECRUITMENT OF Ex-OFFENDERS
A. Ex-Offender Enlistment, Recruit Quality, and
Servicemember Attrition
"'Attrition' is typically defined in the military as the separation or
discharge of a person, for any reason, prior to the completion of the first
term of enlistment."' 103 In addition to diminishing force size and troop
morale, attrition entails the considerable expense of recruiting, training,
and then replacing lost servicemembers.' ° Attrition is increasingly a
major problem throughout the military.0 5 In the Marine Corps, for
example, approximately one-third of recruits attrite before completing
their first term of service.
10 6
Unsuitability is by far the most common reason for servicemember
attrition) t07 Unsuitability attrition usually reflects a recruit's failure to
meet basic standards of performance or behavior. 10 8 When a ser-
vicemember separates for unsuitability reasons, the assumption tends to
be that he or she should never have been recruited in the first place -
i.e., that the system failed to detect a fatal, inherent flaw in the applicant.
Frequently, the undetected flaw is believed to reside in the recruit's
moral character.' °9
103. Frabutt, supra note 25, at 7.
104. In 1998, the DOD estimated that it costs $35,532 to recruit and train each enlistee. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFMCE, MILITARY ATTRITION: BETTER DATA, COUPLED WITH POLICY
CHANGES, COULD HELP THE SERVICES REDUCE EARLY SEPARATIONS 3 (1998), available at http://
stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA354034.
Recruitment expenses alone account for a substantial portion of this figure. A publication released
in 2005 by the RAND Corporation reported that "it costs the U.S. Army about $15,000 to recruit
one soldier, and it must recruit 80,000 to 90,000 each year." BUDDIN, supra note 89, at xiii
(footnote omitted).
105. "One recent memorandum from a senior Army personnel official branded the problem 'a
matter of great concern."' Jaffe, supra note 7; see also DON BOHN & EDWARD SCHMITZ,
COMMANDER, NAVY RECRUITING COMMAND, RESEARCH REPORT, WAIVER POLICY AND ATrRITION
2-3 (1996) (discussing Naval attrition); PtrrKA ET AL., supra note 36, at 1; David A. Anderson,
First-Term Attrition: Perception Versus Reality, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, Feb. 1998, at 47-48
(discussing Marine Corps attrition).
106. See Anderson, supra note 105, at 47.
107. See, e.g., Frabutt, supra note 25, at 24 ("12,535 recruits, 26 percent of the California
sample in this study, received an unsuitability discharge before completing their first term of
service. An additional 10.2 percent of this group were discharged for reasons other than
unsuitability, making the total attrition rate 36.2 percent. This suggests that 71.8 percent of all
first-term attrition results from unsuitability.").
108. Id. at 7 ("Unsuitability discharges include personnel discharged prior to completion of
their first time of enlistment under interservice separation codes ... 60 through 87 and 101-102.
These codes are defined by the Department of Defense .... ").
109. See Anderson, supra note 105, at 47 (describing observers within the Marines who "are
convinced that the root of the [attrition] problem is the type of young men and women the Marine
Corps is recruiting. This perceived problem originates in the inordinate number of young men and
1016 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:997
Nearly all research on the relationship between offense history and
unsuitability attrition points to the unsurprising conclusion that recruits
with criminal backgrounds are more likely to be discharged prematurely
than those without such backgrounds. As early as 1965, a study of
approximately 13,000 Air Force members found higher unsuitability dis-
charge rates for recruits with multiple, concealed, or serious arrest his-
tory records."' Similarly, a series of studies conducted in various
branches throughout the 1980s found a positive correlation between
unsuitability attrition and receipt of a moral waiver.' The 1990s saw
sustained research on the relationship between criminal history, moral
waivers, and servicemember attrition."' In all relevant studies, the
important question was how much - not whether - pre-service criminal
history correlates with poor in-service performance and unsuitability
attrition." I3  A GAO report covering 1990 to 1993 revealed that 20.6%
of individuals with a moral waiver, compared to 13.3% of individuals
without a moral waiver, separated from the Armed Forces due to
"misconduct."'"' Similarly, researchers have discovered significant
correlations in studies relating to the Army,' 5 the Navy, 1' 6 and the
women who enter the Marine Corps with drug or moral waivers"); cf BUDDIN, supra note 89, at
xvi (factors listed that "make[ ] a difference" on first-term attrition from the Army - "Time in
DEP [Delayed Entry Program]; Gender and education; FTU [fitness training unit] participation;
BCT [basic combat training] base/time; Occupation [in Army]; ACF [Army College Fund], bonus,
enlistment length; Recruiting environment; Recruiter characteristics" - contain no reference to
moral waivers or criminal history).
110. Lake, supra note 79, at 3.
Ill. Id. at4.
112. Eli S. Flyer is especially responsible for bringing research attention to moral waiver
policy. Flyer's work even spurred the Navy to form a working group especially devoted to these
issues. See EDWARD SCHMITZ & JOHN HOPPER, U.S. NAVY RECRUITING COMMAND: THE NAVY
MORAL WAIVER STUDY (1996), available at http://www.ijoa.org/imta96/paper30.html; see also
BOHN & SCHMITZ, supra note 105, at 2-3 (crediting Flyer with inspiriting research interest
regarding this subject within the Navy).
113. "The big question" in all these studies "is the severity of the difference in attrition rates
for recruits with moral waivers versus those without." Lyle D. Hall, Analyzing Success of Navy
Enlistees with Moral Waivers, at 11 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School) (on file with the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California).
114. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, 31-32. Servicemembers without a moral
waiver were also almost twice as likely to reenlist as servicemembers with a moral waiver -
seventeen percent of the former category compared to nine percent of the latter. Id.
115. In 1994, Flyer's Army study identified "a high correlation between moral waivers... and
pre-service and in-service criminal activities." Lake, supra note 79, at 6-7.
116. A 1995 Navy study, examining the relationship between pre-service and in-service
criminal behavior, determined that "28 percent of male offenders were granted a moral waiver for
entry into the Navy. Approximately 14 percent of female offenders were also granted a moral
waiver. These proportions are higher than for their non-offender counterparts: 22.6 percent of
male offenders and 10 percent of female non-offenders." See Lake, supra note 79, at 30. Flyer's
own work regarding Naval recruitment in California, published in 1996, found that recruits with
an arrest history had a much greater unsuitability attrition rate (41.8%) than recruits with no arrest
history (22.9%). Of course, the military counts convictions - not arrests - as the basis of moral
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Marines. "17
Time and again, enlistees who receive (or should have received)
moral waivers are shown to be less suitable than recruits with no prior
offense history. But does this mean, as some commentators suggest, that
the weaker group "should be screened out by tougher recruiting stan-
dards"? t8 Not necessarily. Even if ex-offenders are poorer long-term
investments than other recruits, the price of their inclusion in the Armed
Forces must be weighed against its multiple benefits. Though rarely dis-
cussed or even acknowledged in the attrition-related literature, some of
these advantages - to the military, society, and ex-offenders themselves
- are nonetheless always implicit in the very data used to make the case
for more stringent enlistment and screening standards.
First, the effect of a criminal record appears to be statistically sig-
nificant but hardly overwhelming. Although each of the studies cited
above found a positive correlation between pre-service criminal history
and unsuitability attrition or in-service misconduct, the difference
between ex-offenders and non-offenders was almost always less than ten
percent.'1 9 Thus, there is no reason to expect that attrition rates would
plummet, or even substantially decrease, if the Armed Forces ceased
granting moral waivers or ceased admitting individuals who have crimi-
nal backgrounds. 2 °
waiver requirements; but Flyer also found an attrition rate of 41.4% among members with a moral
waiver. BOHN & ScHmrrz, supra note 105, at 3. These findings were supplemented that same
year by Naval research that used a smaller sample but included more extensive and accurate
information about the subjects' criminal histories. This research ascertained a discharge rate of
almost fifty-percent for members with a felony history, "about 30 percentage points higher than
the discharge rates for recruits" with no offense record whatsoever. Frabutt, supra note 25, at 24.
A 1997 study of the effects of pre-service criminal history on in-service Naval personnel
performance focused on enlistees from Illinois and Florida during the 1980s, covering six and four
recruitment cohorts respectively. Individuals with any kind of felony history (arrest or
conviction) had a discharge rate that was, in the Florida sample, approximately seven percentage
points higher than the rate for individuals without a criminal history and, in the Illinois sample,
approximately twelve percentage points higher. Connor, supra note 80, at 39-40. Emphasizing
that attrition rates are not the only measure of in-service performance, this report also observed
that recruits with a criminal history "are less likely to be promoted .... less likely to be
reenlistment eligible, and less likely to remain in the Navy beyond their first term." Id. at 56.
Finally, a study released the following year involving sailors discharged from the U.S.S.
Eisenhower from 1991 to 1997 found that individuals who received moral waivers were eight
percent more likely to be discharged for misconduct than those without; individuals with criminal
waivers (i.e., waivers for actual criminal convictions) were twelve percent more likely to be
discharged for misconduct. Hall, supra note 113, at 8 (citing DON BOHN, EVALUATION OF THE
NAVY'S MORAL WAIVER POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF THE USS EISENHOWER (1998)).
117. A 1996 study found that recruits who enlisted in the Marines with moral waivers in 1988
were slightly more likely (by over six percentage points) to be discharged for unsuitability. Etcho,
supra note 4, at 33-34.
118. BUDDIN, supra note 89, at xxii.
119. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 113, at 61.
120. As researchers Don Bohn and Edward Schmitz concluded, "[e]xcluding applicants
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Furthermore, the vast majority of individuals who enter the Armed
Forces with a criminal background, even a felony conviction, are not
ultimately unsuitable for military service. The rate of ex-offender attri-
tion never reached fifty percent in any study, and in most cases the attri-
tion rate was substantially lower. 2 ' In fact, the GAO's DOD-wide
report found that moral waiver recipients, though more likely to be dis-
charged for unsuitability, were more likely than individuals without
moral waivers to complete their term of service.'22 In light of a forty
percent overall criminal recidivism rate,' 23 the trajectory of ex-offenders
who enter the military may be more accurately characterized as a suc-
cess story.
Finally, many studies showing a correlation between attrition and
criminal history found that other variables were considerably more sig-
nificant. Challenging the usual spin on ex-offender performance and
attrition, one team of researchers discovered that "the importance of a
waiver is not as great as that associated with race, education, AFQT, or
even time in DEP."'24 Another study found that unsuitability discharge
rates correlate much more strongly with high school graduation status
than receipt of a moral waiver.1 2 5 Thus, unless we are prepared to say
that, across the board, non-graduates make bad troops, we should not say
that ex-offenders cannot make good ones.
B. Social Policy Considerations
This section treats what the existing literature and research, sur-
veyed above, consistently fails to take into account: the interests of civil-
ian society per se in the question of ex-offender recruitment into the
requiring waivers will reduce attrition" by a few percentage points "but the savings will be far
outweighed by the cost to recruit additional qualified applicants." BoN & SCHMrrZ, supra note
105, at 9.
121. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 113, at 61.
122. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 31. The key distinction here is between
attrition generally and attrition by dint of unsuitability. A 1983 study focusing on the former
determined that moral waiver accessions are not much more likely than non-waiver accessions to
separate from service for failure to meet behavioral or performance standards. See Connor, supra
note 80, at 8. One factor that probably serves to counteract ex-offenders' greater likelihood of
unsuitability attrition is their lack of feasible employment alternatives should they fail in military
service - there is a positive correlation between offense history and unemployment in the civilian
sector, see infra Part III.B.2, and also a positive correlation between unemployment at time of
military enlistment and likelihood of completing one's first term of service, see BUDDIN, supra
note 89, at 10-11.
123. See Doing More Than Time, supra note 3, at 10.
124. BoHN & ScHMrrz, supra note 105, at 6.
125. Wiskoff & Dunipace, supra note 94, at 20; see also JAMES R. HoSEK & MICHAEL G.
MATTOCK, RAND, LEARNING ABOUT QuALrrY: How THE QuALrrY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IS
REVEALED OVER TIME 3 (2003) ("High school diploma graduates are far more likely than high
school dropouts to complete their first term of service .... " (citation omitted)).
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Armed Forces. Though military researchers have produced numerous
studies on this topic, 126 their work focuses almost exclusively on ex-
offender attrition and in-service performance. Civilian society has
hardly picked up the slack. Criminal corrections experts and public
policymakers seem wholly unaware of the "military option" that many
ex-offenders actually choose and that so many more might do well to
consider. 127
The term "ex-offender" as used in this section does not refer to
persons convicted or fined for petty offenses like littering or parking in a
tow-away zone. Rather, it refers to individuals who are serving or have
served prison sentences, including convicted felons. This focus is
neither radical nor unwarranted. As noted earlier, thousands of felons
have been knowingly admitted into the military, and serious misdemean-
ors constitute the single largest offense category for which moral waiv-
ers are actually granted each year. Nevertheless, in recommending that
ex-offenders be considered more seriously - and candidly - for military
recruitment, this Article contemplates only so-called "moral" qualifica-
tions. Offenders, especially more serious cases, are more likely than the
general population to have intellectual, mental, and even physical limita-
tions that would hinder their enlistment, regardless of criminal
history. 128
1. THE RECRUIT POOL
In 2001, the U.S. prison population exceeded two million inmates
for the first time.1 29 Since this "unprecedented event in the history...
of liberal democracy,"1 30 the number of Americans behind bars has
remained relatively constant,"' while the percentage imprisoned for vio-
lent crime continues to rise. 13 2 According to the DOJ, "[o]verall, the
126. See supra Part III.A.
127. For example, during recent congressional hearings on offender recidivism and
rehabilitation, no one on either side of the aisle even mentioned the possibility, actual or imagined,
of ex-offender recruitment into the Armed Forces. See generally Confronting Recidivism:
Prisoner Re-entry Programs and a Just Future for All Americans: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearings].
128. "The National Adult Literacy Survey established that 11 percent of inmates, compared
with 3 percent of the general U.S. population, have a learning disability, and 3 percent are
mentally retarded." Petersilia, supra note 2, at 66.
129. David Garland, The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MAss IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1 (David Garland ed., 2001).
130. Id.
131. See Hearings, supra note 127, at 6 (testimony of Rep. Cummings).
132. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN,
PRISONERS IN 2002, at 10 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p02.pdf ("As
a percentage of the total growth [in State inmates between 1995 and 2001], violent offenders
accounted for 63% of the growth .... ")
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United States incarcerated 2,267,787 persons at [year-end] 2004," and
"[t]he rate of incarceration in prison at [year-end] 2004 was 486 sen-
tenced inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents."' t3 3 The proportion of Afri-
can-American men who are incarcerated is simply astounding: 3,218 for
every 100,000.134
Of course, the prison door is rarely a one-way passage. Hundreds
of thousands of people exit prison, as well as enter it, each year. Record
incarceration rates have produced record release rates.' 35 In 2003 alone,
more than 600,000 inmates - approximately the population of Washing-
ton, D.C. - were returned to civilian society: about 1,600 people per
day.' 36 This represents more than a fourfold increase in annual prison
releases since 1980.117 Recognizing this drastic challenge, President
Bush recently pleaded for compassion toward the hundreds of thousands
of people annually "released from prison back into society."'
13 8
For many prisoners, the prison door is a revolving one.' 39 Approxi-
mately forty percent of ex-convicts in the U.S. are reincarcerated.1
40
Part of what makes ex-prisoner recidivism so distressing is the demon-
strable failure of the "corrections" system to accomplish its nominal pur-
pose, not to mention the immense waste of resources inherent in such
failure. Thus, it is no surprise that, with the specific goal of reducing
recidivism rates, "policymakers, correctional system administrators, and




The extent of incarceration and prison release is important here
133. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN,
PRISONERS IN 2004, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/p04.htm.
134. This is compared to 1,220 Hispanic male inmates per 100,000 Hispanic males and 463
white male inmates per 100,000 white males. Id. at 8.
135. "Never before in U.S. history have so many individuals been released from prison."
Petersilia, supra note 2, at 66.
136. Id. 630,000 was the figure Representative Cummings used before Congress in 2005. See
Hearings, supra note 127, at 6 (testimony of Rep. Cummings).
137. In 1980, almost 150,000 inmates were released from prison. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITrEES, PRISONER RELEASES: TRENDS AND
INFORMATION ON REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS 3 (2001) [hereinafter GAO PRISONER RELEASES].
138. Hearings, supra note 127, at 32 (testimony of Rep. Davis). For "most of those released
from prison today," the extent of the help they need is exacerbated by
serious social and medical problems. More than three-fourths of the inmates
scheduled for release in the next year report a history of drug and/or alcohol abuse.
One-fourth have histories of injection drug use and 16 percent report a mental
condition. Yet less than one-third of exiting inmates received substance abuse or
mental health treatment in prison.
Petersilia, supra note 2, at 66.
139. GAO PRISONER RELEASES, supra note 137, at 3 (discussing how "releasees are often
subsequently reincarcerated").
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id. at 1-2.
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because, first, these trends have a significant impact on the military
recruitment pool. According to the DOJ, more than fifty million Ameri-
cans - twenty-nine percent of the adult population - have an arrest
record. 4  This number has doubled since a decade ago, 143 meaning that
young people and especially young men, the most likely to commit
crimes and the most eagerly sought military recruits, have increasingly
problematic criminal histories.' 44 More than thirteen million Americans
are ex-felons - six percent of the adult population, eleven percent of the
adult male population, and more than thirty percent of the adult African-
American male population.' 45
Clearly, potential recruits with spotless records become harder to
find each year, both proportionally and in absolute numbers. But crimi-
nal activity does not always entail a criminal record. If enlistees in the
Armed Forces were as honest with recruiters as they are with researchers
who ensure confidentiality, it is likely that the vast majority of recruits
would require moral waivers. Criminologists have found that a large
percentage of males will be arrested at least once for something more
serious than a traffic infraction; and an even larger percentage, approxi-
mately ninety percent, commit at least one criminal offense (whether
arrested or not) in their lifetime, most often in their youth. 4 6 The corre-
lation between youth, male gender, and criminality is astounding.147
Nearly seventy percent of persons arrested for serious crimes are under
the age of twenty-five,'48 and men are anywhere from five to fifty times
more likely than women to be arrested. 149 The effect of such trends on
would-be recruits is as unsurprising as it is inevitable: increased diffi-
culty of meeting the military's moral character standards. 1
50
2. WHY ENLIST? - THE EX-OFFENDER'S SITUATION
A seasoned recruiter recently told the New York Times that "[t]he
only people who want to join the Army now have issues .... They're
142. Petersilia, supra note 2, at 68.
143. Id.
144. See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
145. Petersilia, supra note 2, at 68. By "ex-felon," Petersilia means persons who "had been
convicted of a felony and served or are currently serving a felony probation, parole, prison, or jail
sentence."
146. JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 146 (1985).
147. MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 123-153
(1990).
148. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONS. & STATISTICS ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 199 (1993), available at http://www2.census.gov/
prod2/statcomp/documents/1993-01 .pdf.
149. WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 104.
150. REBECCA M. KILBURN & JACOB A. KLERMAN, RAND, ENLISTMENT DECISIONS IN THE
1990s: EVIDENCE FROM INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA 25 (1999).
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troubled, with health, police or drug problems.""5 ' However hyperbolic
his rhetoric, 52 the recruiter's statement refers to a very real dilemma.
Not only has increased criminality among young men made acceptable
recruits harder to find, individuals who have been arrested are "signifi-
cantly" more likely to enlist than attend college.1 53 This increased pro-
pensity exists despite the probable deterrent effects of the military's
nominal disqualification of felons, its attempts to conduct criminal his-
tory investigations, and its extensive moral waiver procedures.1 54
As with any recruit pool, ex-offenders' increased probability of
enlistment strongly relates to their overall employment situation. Ex-
offenders must overcome tremendous obstacles to finding and maintain-
ing a job. These obstacles sometimes arise from social or intellectual
limitations that preceded, and are relatively unrelated to, their criminal
conduct. Most inmates lack "marketable skills or sufficient literacy to
become gainfully employed;" '55 and because they have little pre-prison
experience as productive members of the workforce, 156 they do not
know the mechanics of finding post-prison employment.1 57  Thus, as
explained in Robert Taggert's The Prison of Unemployment, a criminal
conviction only exacerbates these individuals' earlier employment
woes.
158
If ex-offenders have comparatively less to offer employers by way
of skills and capabilities, it is at least equally true that employers offer -
and choose to offer - precious few opportunities to ex-offenders. Cus-
tomarily, once "paroled or released, [the ex-convict] is excluded from a
number of jobs and given little help in finding his way back into the
world of work."' 59 The Ex-Inmate's Guide to Successful Employment,
itself written by a onetime prisoner, observes that "[a]lmost anyone who
has spent time in prison has some story to tell about his or her quest for
a job (and a fresh start) ... and how his or her prison record" thwarted
that quest. 160 And the more serious one's crime, the more difficult it is
151. Cave, supra note 77 (internal quotations omitted).
152. This recruiter's actual percentage of enlistments who were known to have "a problem that
[either] needed concealing" or a moral waiver was one-third. Id.
153. KILBURN & KLERMAN, supra note 150, at xvi-xvii.
154. Similarly, Kilburn and Klerman found "that having been arrested or having a friend who
has been arrested raises the likelihood of enlisting, which is surprising given that this variable was
expected to proxy for having difficulty meeting the moral requirements for enlistment." Id. at 59.
155. Petersilia, supra note 2, at 66.
156. One-third of inmates were unemployed at the time of their most recent arrest. Id.
157. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION HANDBOOK FOR Ex-OFFENDERS 1 (2005).
158. ROBERT TAGGART II, THE PRISON OF UNEMPLOYMENT: MANPOWER PROGRAMS FOR
OFFENDERS 2 (1972).
159. Id.
160. ERROL CRAIG SULL, THE EX-INMATE'S GUIDE TO SUCCESSFUL EMPLOYMENT, at vii (4th
ed. 2003).
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to find and maintain employment. In the recent words of D.C. Congres-
sional Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton, "a felony conviction is close to
a death sentence in the job market."'
' 61
Increasingly, legislatures are the bodies imposing this job market
"death sentence" by statutorily barring ex-felons from one occupation
after another. Even as prisons reduce employment-related services to
present and former inmates,1 62 a generation's worth of punitive state and
federal laws have narrowed the range of jobs open to ex-offenders.
63
At the federal level, in addition to an extensive array of outright restric-
tions imposed upon ex-offenders' employability,"64 certain kinds of
work licenses are revoked or withheld from individuals convicted of
various crimes. 165 Also, judges have significant latitude to impose occu-
pational prohibitions as part of criminal sentencing.
66
It has been argued that legal impediments to ex-offenders'
employability support a regime of "invisible punishment" because their
"effectiveness, impact, [and] implementation" are often hidden from the
public eye and are difficult to measure. 167 This invisibility is reinforced
by the fact that private individuals, not legislatures or courts, are prima-
rily responsible for the job market "death sentence." Even when hiring
policies do not explicitly exclude individuals convicted of a crime, the
same result is often achieved more subtly. 68 About sixty-five percent of
employers of unskilled workers in five major American cities would not
"knowingly hire an ex-offender (regardless of the offense)," and almost
forty percent actively investigate new hires' criminal records.
169
161. Hearings, supra note 127, at 18.
162. Petersilia, supra note 2, at 67.
163. Id.
164. See COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION, supra note 21, at 2-8.
165. Id. at 4-5.
166. For example,
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(5), 3583(d), and the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, the sentencing court may impose certain occupational restrictions as a
condition of probation or supervised release. Restrictions are authorized when a
"reasonably direct relationship"' exists between the defendant's occupation and the
offense conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5), U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)(l); and the conditions
are "reasonably necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe
that, absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful
conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted." U.S.S.G.
§ 5F1.5(a)(2). If such an occupational restriction is imposed, it must be imposed
"for the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary to protect the public."
U.S.S.G. § 5FI.5(b).
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION, supra note 21, at 4.
167. Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS UNEMPLOYMENT 15, 16 (Marc Mauer
& Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
168. TAGGART, supra note 158, at 84.
169. Petersilia, supra note 2, at 68.
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As one employment manual warns, individuals found guilty of felo-
nies must "answer 'yes' to THAT question ('Were you ever convicted of
a felony?'). '" 7" However, as we saw earlier in the military context,
many applicants who technically should answer "yes" decide, for obvi-
ous reasons, to say "no." Prevarication of this sort is so widespread -
and indeed, so understandable - that even the Department of Labor
merely suggests that ex-offenders respond honestly when asked about
their criminal histories. 7' It nearly goes without saying that ex-offend-
ers are discouraged from ever volunteering such information.' 72
The drastically reduced range of occupational possibilities available
to known ex-offenders has created a veritable criminal closet:' 73 "Many
ex-offenders have never honestly answered the question, '[h]ave you
ever been convicted of a crime?' "'17 Eve Sedgwick's observation that
the "double bind" of disclosure/non-disclosure is one of the hallmarks of
the contemporary regime of the closet,'75 as the word is usually under-
stood, is certainly true of the ex-offender's experience.' 76 "As individu-
als with [criminal] records so frequently find out, you are either damned
if you do and damned if you don't."'1 77 According to one criminologist,
"[i]f parolees are truthful about their backgrounds, many employers will
not hire them. If they are not truthful, they can be fired for lying if the
170. SULL, supra note 160, at iv.
171. "To tell or not to tell. It's up to you, but we recommend honesty." The authors
continued, "[o]n the application put 'will discuss in interview' rather than a lengthy explanation of
past convictions. In an interview, keep explanations short and stress what you learned in prison
and what your skills and assets are. Be positive!" DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 157, app. B.
Interestingly, the Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure at Georgetown University Law Center
used almost exactly the same language - "To lie or not to lie" - in a report on ex-offender
employment published many years earlier. HERBERT S. MILLER & GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR.
INST. OF CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, THE CLOSED DOOR: THE EFFECT OF A CRIMINAL
RECORD ON EMPLOYMENT WITH STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC AGENCIES, at v (1972) (prepared for
the Manpower Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, under research contract number K 81-
09-70-02, authorized by Title I of the Manpower Development and Training Act.).
172. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 157, app. B (emphasis supplied).
173. Note the titie of a very recent Mother Jones article detailing an ex-convict's employment
search woes. Sara Catania, Freedom = Silence, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 16-17
available at http://www.motherjones.com/news/outfron/2005/09/freedomsilence.html?welcome
=true.
174. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 157, app. B.
175. EVE KosOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 54 (1990) (referring to "the
double binds" that make "the stakes in matters of definitional control [so] extremely high").
176. As David J. Harding observed in Jean Valjean's Dilemma, ex-offenders must carefully
"manage their deviant identities in the labor market. Institutional limitations imposed by both the
labor market and the criminal justice system as well as subjects' interpretations of stigma play
important roles in determining how they choose to present themselves to others." David J.
Harding, Jean Valjean's Dilemma: The Management of Ex-Convict Identity in the Search for
Employment, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 571.
177. MILLER ET AL., supra note 171, at v.
2007] BALANCING YOUR STRENGTHS AGAINST YOUR FELONIES 1025
employer learns about their conviction."1
78
Given the formidable barriers to finding work, the military's evi-
dent willingness to grant moral waivers makes it an appealing option for
many ex-offenders. 179 But the quantity of available work is not the only
factor explaining the demonstrated propensity of ex-offenders to enlist;
quality also matters. When "the only available jobs are often undemand-
ing, unattractive, and unrewarding, offering the offender little induce-
ment to turn [away] from criminal behavior,"' 80 the opportunities that
military service affords must appear especially attractive. Although
"patriotic considerations" may be at play in some individuals' enlistment
decisions, "self-interested considerations" tend to be primary for most of
those who actually enter the Services.' 8 ' These considerations - which
include benefits such as technical training, an array of long-term career
opportunities, and the inculcation of "endurance, self-reliance, and self-
discipline"'82 - are bound to be particularly impressive to ex-offenders
with a desire to restart their lives. Moreover, in such a "low-caste" pop-
ulation, certain symbolic rewards accompany the more material advan-
tages of military service.' 83 These include pride, social respect, and
even "official government encouragement or approval."' 84
3. WHY RECRUIT? - BENEFITS TO SOCIETY
We have seen why enlistment is good for ex-offenders, and earlier
178. Petersilia, supra note 2, at 68; see also DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 157, app. B ("Ex-
offenders may be fired for falsifying information on their job application.").
179. "Potential recruits to the military face a choice among further education, the civilian
workforce, working at home, and enlisting in the military. Potential recruits balance the
advantages and disadvantages of each alternative to choose the most attractive life choice for
themselves." MICHAEL P. MURRAY & LAURIE L. McDONALD, RECENT RECRUITING TRENDS AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR MODELS OF ENLISTMENT SUPPLY 2 (1999). Since further education and
the civilian workforce are unlikely possibilities for most ex-offenders, there may be no genuine
alternative (other than less desirable private sector employment) to military enlistment.
180. TAGGART, supra note 158, at 83.
181. Adrian M.S. Piper, The Rationality of Military Service, in CONSCRIPTS AND VOLUNTEERS:
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 126, 127 (Robert K.
Fullinwider ed., 1983) ("Patriotic considerations are addressed less frequently to those who are to
be convinced to enlist in the All-Volunteer Force itself. To those young men and women who are
adjudged to be the most capable of making a contribution to this country's welfare through their
military defense of it (rather than, say, through their technical or professional skills within the
civilian sector, their roles as parents, or their anticipated roles as educated and productive citizens
upon completion of their education), appeal is more often made to self-interested considerations.
These considerations represent military life as the most attractive option available for pursuing
personal aspirations.")
182. Id. at 126-27.
183. Stephen Cohen, The Untouchable Soldier: Caste, Politics, and the Indian Army, in
RECRUITING, DRAFTING, AND ENLISTING: Two SIDES OF THE RAISING OF MILITARY FORCES 167-68
(Peter Karsten ed., 1998).
184. Id.
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we explored why ex-offender enlistment may be good for the mili-
tary. 85 Now we will consider why such enlistment may be good for
society. Ultimately, the same reasons that have been offered to
encourage military recruitment of "'disadvantaged Americans" may
apply, perhaps even more strongly, to ex-offenders: "[M]ilitary service
may complete the[ir] integration ... as productive, self-respecting, and
patriotic citizens. By ameliorating the deplorable social conditions of
which most civilian institutions have apparently washed their hands,
military service may have further positive consequences for society at
large." 186
The job market's widespread exclusion of individuals who have
served their sentences is not only unfair;' 87 by impeding ex-offenders'
reintegration and rehabilitation, it is also tragically unwise. This isola-
tion has a "profound" impact on these individuals' subsequent criminal
trajectories.' 88 Finding gainful employment "is critical to successful
reintegration. Employment helps ex-offenders become productive, take
care of their families, develop valuable life skills, and strengthen their
self-esteem and social connectedness."' 89  In the face of constant
employment rejection, "too many ex-inmates give up, think they can't
work within the system, and go back to.. . surviving the only way they
think can work for them - illegally. The usual result? Back to prison
for a longer time ... or worse."'190
Although it is hardly necessary to justify society's interest in reduc-
ing criminal recidivism, it should be noted that this necessity becomes
only more pressing each year. As one congressman recently observed,
"rehabilitating and reintegrating prisoners back into society continues to
loom as one of the great needs of our day."19' This Article's primary
185. See supra Parts III.A-.B.
186. Piper, supra note 181, at 137.
187. Travis eloquently suggested that this practice is very unfair:
In this brave new world, punishment for the original offense is no longer enough;
one's debt to society is never paid. Some commentators, seeing parallels with
practices from another era when convicts were sent to faraway lands, refer to this
form of punishment as "internal exile." Others liken this extreme labeling to "the
mark of Cain," and the effects of these sanctions as relegating the offender to the
status of "non-citizen, almost a pariah." The National Council on Crime and
Delinquency summarized the effects this way: "Even when the sentence has been
completely served, the fact that a man has been convicted of a felony pursues him
like Nemesis."
Travis, supra note 167, at 19 (internal citations omitted).
188. Petersilia, supra note 2, at 67.
189. Id.
190. SULL, supra note 160, at vii.
191. Hearings, supra note 127, at 32 (statement of Rep. Davis).
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concern is to suggest that ex-offender recruitment may be, and should
be, considered by policymakers as one way of addressing this need.
The hypothesis that proactive military recruitment of ex-offenders
could have a positive effect on recidivism is mainly based on two ratio-
nales: "(1) that the military environment removes the opportunity to
commit crime; and/or (2) that military training teaches responsibility and
discipline, thereby deterring future crime."1 92 With regard to these ratio-
nales, "[o]ne potentially corrective influence is the drastic change in
lifestyle required when entering the military."'
' 93
Although the relationship between criminality and military service
is not extensively documented, 94 some existing studies confirm an
inverse relationship between the two. 195 Some of these studies have
quite an impressive vintage. A recent analysis of research conducted in
the 1930s through the 1950s found that juvenile delinquents were "much
more likely" to be dishonorably discharged than non-delinquents, but
that entry into the military was a positive "turning point" for some in the
former category.' 9 6 A 1979 study found that recidivism was less preva-
lent among men paroled into the Army during the Second World War
and the Korean War than for those who were paroled into civilian soci-
ety, 197 and subsequent research involving Vietnam veterans found that
among white ex-offenders, desistance occurred earlier in those who had
"military experience" than among those who never enlisted.' 98 More
recently, a 1999 study found that drug use declined after military enlist-
ment, even more than for individuals who started fulltime work or
entered college.1 99 Finally, an "exploratory" study conducted in 2004
indicated that "the military may produce desistence from crime, espe-
cially for the most serious offenders. '"200
Of course, desistence usually does not simply mean the absence of
crime. In the case of ex-offenders recruited into the military, the major-
192. Leana Allen Bouffard & John H. Laub, Jail or the Army: Does Military Service Facilitate
Desistence from Crime?, in AFTER CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO OFFENDER
REINTEGRATION 129, 130 (Shadd Maruna & Russ Immarigeon eds., 2004) ("The military ...
actively seeks to instil[l] structure and discipline with the initial basic training experience and with
continued rigorous training throughout the military career. It is commonly thought that this
disciplined environment will encourage a responsible lifestyle and discourage criminal
behaviour.").
193. Id.
194. Id. at 146.
195. Id. at 133-34.
196. Id. at 132 (discussing the work of Sampson and Laub in 1993 and 1995).
197. See Bouffard & Laub, supra note 192, at 132 (discussing this 1979 study).
198. Bouffard & Laub, supra note 192, at 132-33 (discussing Rand's 1987 research).
199. Jerald G. Bachman et a]., Changing Patters of Drug Use Among U.S. Military Recruits
Before and After Enlistment, 89 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 672 (1999).
200. Bouffard & Laub, supra note 192, at 147.
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ity of whom successfully complete their terms of service, desistence
comes along with positive contributions to society. In Robert Taggert's
words,
all too frequently, especially in the case of those who are arrested,
found guilty, and sent to jail, their economic and social potential is
squandered by them and by society. . . . From start to finish, the
picture is one of wasted human resources - of skills and abilities
which are underdeveloped and underutilized.2 °1
Concerted recruitment of ex-offenders would acknowledge the very real
potential these individuals possess, and it might often yield some very
real contributions.2 °2
V. CONCLUSION
Earlier in this Article, we saw how an extensive moral waiver sys-
tem undermines the Armed Forces' ostensibly stringent policy on ex-
offender enlistment and permits thousands of known criminals to enlist
each year. Relatedly, we explored a character screening process that
fails to detect the criminal backgrounds of approximately half of those
who should receive a waiver. Then, looking at ex-offenders' in-service
performance, we learned that such recruits are somewhat (perhaps only
slightly) less likely than non-offenders to be satisfactory ser-
vicemembers, while most ex-offenders admitted into the Armed Forces
perform well enough to at least complete their contractual term of ser-
vice. Finally, we examined some of the social policy issues at stake in
this question, including the increasing proportion of ex-offenders in the
military recruitment pool, the relative attractiveness of a military career
to ex-offenders - many of whom face significant difficulties finding
employment in any field - and the potential benefits to society of mili-
tary service among ex-offenders.
201. TAGGART, supra note 158, at 1-2.
202. The possibility of using military enlistment to advance such policy ends, to the mutual
benefit of the Armed Forces and civilian society, is one that has been recognized and implemented
before in the United States. For example,
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara initiated "Project 100,000" in response
to President Johnson's War on Poverty under which men who would have been
disqualified because of failure to meet mental standards or easily correctible
physical defects were allowed to enlist. Generally referred to as the "New
Standards" men, about 320,000 such recruits entered the military between 1967 and
1971, when the program was abandoned because of decreased manpower
requirements. The DOD report describes the rationale behind the program: "We
were convinced that a very high proportion of these men would qualify as fully
satisfactory servicemen exposed to the modem instructional techniques used in the
Armed Forces. As a by-product, their service would prepare them for more
productive lives when they returned to civilian life."
Kmnv & THIE, supra note 23, at 67 n.6 (internal citation omitted).
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This Article has aimed to elucidate rather than weigh these various
considerations. Even so, it is hardly possible to reiterate each of the
major points raised in the preceding pages without noticing that a cur-
rent, de facto ex-offender recruitment policy exists within the U.S.
Armed Forces. But because this practice, accomplished through a sys-
tem of winks and nods, is characterized as an exception rather than the
rule, almost no resources have been devoted to the development of strat-
egies that would maximize the various interests at play - those of the
military, ex-offenders, and civilian society.
Aside from admittedly serious ethical concerns - such as forcefully
maintaining the line between recruitment and conscription - it is easy to
see why ex-offenders and civilian society would probably benefit from a
more forthright implementation of this recruitment practice."0 3 It is
important to emphasize that the military might also benefit - potentially
in ways that are directly responsive to the attrition rates and performance
defects lamented in the existing literature on ex-offender recruitment. A
full, candid acknowledgement that such individuals serve in the mili-
tary's ranks would allow for the development of programs, both pre- and
post-enlistment, designed specifically with these recruits in mind. Ulti-
mately, if the Armed Forces were more forthright and proactive in bal-
ancing recruits' strengths against their felonies, there is reason to think
we might all be stronger.
203. See supra Part III.
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Number of Offenses Requiring Moral Waiver
Offense Level Army Navy Marines Air Force
Felony 1; no waiver 1 or more. 1; no waiver I or more.
allowed for allowed for more
more than I. than I.
Serious 2; no waiver I or 2; no I to 5; no 1 or more.
Misdemeanor allowed for 5 or waiver allowed waiver allowed
more. for 3 or more. for 6 or more.
Minor Misdemeanor Category not 3 to 5; no Category not 1 or more.
used. waiver allowed used.
for 6 or more.
Minor Non-Traffic 3 or more; 3 3 to 5; no 2 to 9; no Depending on
convictions for a waiver allowed waiver allowed seriousness of
combination of for 6 or more. for 10 or more. offense: I or
misdemeanors more; 2 in the
and minor non- last three years;
traffic offenses. or 3 or more in
a lifetime.
Serious Traffic Category not Category not 2 or more; no Category not
used. used. waiver for 6 or used.
more.
Minor Traffic 6 or more where Within three 5 or more. Depending on
fine exceeded years prior to seriousness of
$100 per enlistment, 6 or offense: 2 in last
offense, more in any three years, or 3
twelve-month or more in a
period or 10 or lifetime; 6 or
more in total, more minor traf-







204. GAO MILITARY RECRUITING, supra note 14, at 4.
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TABLE 2. 1990-1997 WAIVER GRANT FIGURES
Fiscal Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Army Moral Waivers 5,989 5,648 5,186 4,301 3,304 3,203 2,260 2,394
Percentage of 6.7 7.2 6.7 5.6 4.9 5.1 3.1 2.9
Enlistments
Navy Moral Waivers 11,890 9,016 7,244 8,028 5,759 6,248 7,323 6,554
Percentage of 18.6 18.2 16.7 16.2 16.2 17.3 18.8 14.7
Enlistments
Marine Corps Moral 20,451 17,610 15,791 10,162 6,997 5,205 4,076 2,992
Waivers
Percentage of 61.2 59.2 49.7 29.3 22.0 16.2 12.4 11.7
Enlistments
Air Force Moral 712 850 1,672 2,269 1,883 2,093 1,945 1,868
Waivers
Percentage of 2.0 2.9 4.8 7.2 6.2 6.7 6.3 6.2
Enlistments
DOD Waivers 39,042 33,124 28,893 24,760 17,934 16,749 15,604 14,808
DOD Total 222,567 187,156 187,146 193,029 164,921 161,707 175,466 190,464
Enlistments
Percentage DOD 17.5 17.7 16.0 12.8 10.9 10.4 8.9 7.8
Enlistments
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TABLE 3. 2003-2006 WAIVER GRANT FIGURES
Fiscal Year 2003 2004 2005 2006
Army Moral Waivers 4,918 4,529 5,506 8,129
Percentage of Enlistments 7.1 6.3 8.5 11.7
Navy Moral Waivers 4,207 3,846 3,467 3,502
Percentage of Enlistments 10.4 9.8 9.2 9.7
Marine Corps Moral Waivers 19,195 18,669 20,426 20,750
Percentage of Enlistments 49.6 50.7 52.5 54.3
Air Force Moral Waivers 2,632 2,530 1,123 2,095
Percentage of Enlistments 7.3 7.5 5.6 6.8
DOD Total Moral Waivers 30,952 29,574 30,522 34,476
DOD Total Enlistments 184,847 182,051 160,685 174,509
Percentage DOD Enlistments 16.7 16.2 19.0 19.6
TABLE 4. 2003-2006 WAIVER GRANT FIGURES BY OFFENSE CATEGORY
Fiscal Year 2003 2004 2005 2006
Felony 824 638 1,163 1,605
Serious Non-Traffic 10,324 9,235 10,523 13,895
Minor Non-Traffic 1,824 2,533 1,840 2,446
Serious Traffic 1,699 1,413 929 466
Minor Traffic 1,564 1,587 1,369 1,086
Drug 14,717 14,168 14,698 14,978
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